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Abstract
CAPTCHAs are challenge-response tests that aim at preventing un-
wanted machines, including bots, from accessing web services while pro-
viding easy access for humans. Recent advances in artificial-intelligence
based attacks show that the level of security provided by many state-of-
the-art text-based CAPTCHAs is declining. At the same time, techniques
for distorting and obscuring the text, which are used to maintain the level
of security, make text-based CAPTCHAs difficult to solve for humans, and
thereby further degrade usability. The need for developing alternative types
of CAPTCHAs which improve both, the current security and usability levels,
has been emphasized by several researchers.
With this study, we contribute to research through (1) the develop-
ment of two new face recognition CAPTCHAs (Farett-Gender and Farett-
Gender&Age), (2) the security analysis of both procedures, and (3) the pro-
vision of empirical evidence that one of the suggested CAPTCHAs (Farett-
Gender) is similar to Google’s reCAPTCHA and better than KCAPTCHA
concerning effectiveness (error rates), superior to both regarding learnability
and satisfaction but not efficiency.
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1. Introduction
CAPTCHA1 (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart) procedures [7, 44, 89, 90, 92] are challenge-
response tests that aim at preventing unwanted machines, including bots,
from commenting spam in blogs, registering at websites, harvesting email
addresses and conducting dictionary attacks, among others [16]. The need
for protecting web services from unauthorized access is high, as several in-
cidents have shown [64, 57, 62, 73].
Captchas are designed to be easy for humans but difficult for computers.
Several big companies have suggested and applied Captchas [14], includ-
ing Google’s reCAPTCHA [93], eBay Captcha, Yahoo Mail Captcha and
Microsoft’s ASIRRA [31].
A Captcha can also be described as a reverse Turing test in the sense
that a Captcha is administered by a machine and targeted at a human,
in contrast to the original Turing test where roles are switched. When a
Captcha challenge is generated and presented by a service provider (server)
to a service requestor (client), the server subsequently uses the submitted
response in order to distinguish a human client from a machine client and
grants or denies access, accordingly. As the server has to solve a classification
task, two types of errors can occur: (1) a “false-positive” (FP) occurs when
the client is misclassified as a machine although it is a human; (2) a “false-
negative” (FN) occurs when the client is misclassified as a human although
it is a machine.
When a FN occurs, a machine was capable of solving the challenge cor-
rectly and erroneously gets access to a service. This violation of authoriza-
tion has been discussed widely in the security-related literature [1, 98, 14, 85]
and recent studies indicate that many state-of-the-art, text-based Captchas
have been broken [7, 12, 18, 25, 37, 56, 65, 83]. Consequently, the need for
new (non text-based) types of Captchas is manifest, as suggested by several
researchers [7, 12, 20, 54, 56].
When a FP occurs, a user was not capable of solving the Captcha task
correctly and needs to continue solving Captcha tasks until s/he succeeds.
This procedure can be tedious and may finally exclude the user from the
requested service when s/he gives up. In contrast to FNs, this issue is not
related to security but to usability. In fact, the objective of achieving both,
high levels of security and usability, is a critical challenge in the design of
1For the sake of readability, we do not capitalize the term “CAPTCHA” in this paper.
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Captchas [7, 15, 18, 33, 37, 58, 59, 69].
Shortcomings of past research on Captchas include a) a limited diversity
of designs of image-based Captchas, b) a low number of empirical stud-
ies on the usability of image-based Captchas, and c) a low number of em-
pirical studies which compare the usability of text-based and image-based
Captchas. As a result, there is a lack of empirical insights which, in turn,
limits the practical design and deployment of Captchas for service providers.
Low levels of usability of a Captcha negatively affect the use and final adop-
tion of the related service when the users get frustrated solving the Captcha
and finally move to a service of a different provider. This is consistent with
the findings of Chang and Chen [19], who show that - mediated by customer
satisfaction - the quality of an interface (with a Captcha being a part of it)
significantly affects customer loyalty.
In this paper, we contribute to research by (1) suggesting two new
Captchas based on face recognition, (2) analyzing their security, and (3)
empirically evaluating these Captchas against two established text-based
Captchas with regard to four usability measures (effectiveness, efficiency,
learnability and satisfaction). With regard to contribution (1), we devel-
oped two novel Captchas, which we refer to as Farett-Gender and Farett-
Gender&Age2. The Captcha Farett-Gender presents a set of pictures, with
each picture showing either a man or a woman, and requires a user to select
all pictures showing a man/woman. The Captcha Farett-Gender&Age fol-
lows the same procedure and in addition, the user has to distinguish young,
middle-aged and old persons of a given gender. Concerning contribution (2),
we perform a combinatorial analysis, which accounts for two realistic kinds
of attacks: brute-force attacks and attacks based on artificial intelligence.
With regard to contribution (3), we conducted a within-subjects study where
participants had to solve instances of both face recognition Captchas and in-
stances of two state-of-the-art Captchas: reCAPTCHA provided by Google
and the open source project K Captcha [77]. To the best of our knowledge,
we provide the first empirical usability study that compares image-based
Captchas with text-based Captchas.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next sec-
tion, we frame our research and present a brief literature review. Then, we
present two novel Captchas, analyze their security and describe our empiri-
cal usability study before we show its results. We discuss our findings and
conclude with a summary and an outlook.
2Farett is an acronym for Face recognition reverse Turing test.
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2. Framing the discussion
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the various types of
Captchas, operationalize the usability criteria for our usability study, and
provide a structured presentation of literature findings on security and us-
ability of Captchas.
2.1. Types of Captchas
The most common types of Captchas are text-based, audio-based, image-
based or video-based [7, 44, 74, 98].3 The noCaptcha version of reCaptcha,
which has been introduced recently by Google, implements a different ap-
proach: noCaptcha analyzes how a user interacts with a website and verifies
that s/he is human by having her/him click on the “I’m not a robot” check-
box4. In doubt, noCaptcha additionally prompts the user with the text-
based reCaptcha as a fallback. Although the noCatpcha checkbox allegedly
implements a “high degree of sophistication”, it is not a classic challenge-
response type of Captcha. The lack of technical information on how no-
Captcha works creates an impression of “security by obscurity”, which gives
rise to legitimate skepticism among security researchers, e.g., [24]. Figure
B.1 shows examples for each of the four established Captcha types.
Text-based Text-based Captchas require users to recognize distorted text
rendered in an image. The security of these Captchas is based on the
assumption that optical character recognition (OCR) algorithms fail
to solve this type of problem. Google’s reCAPTCHA, for instance,
uses scanned texts from old books or newspapers, and lets the user
decipher those words that could not be recognized by OCR algorithms.
To enhance security, the presented texts are randomly distorted (see
Figure B.1a).
A different approach for text-based Captchas is adopted in SemCAP-
TCHA [53]. It takes the otherwise primitive task of recognizing and
typing letters one step further and adds a semantic element to it.
SemCAPTCHA challenges the user to recognize three distorted words
and to sort out which one does not fit semantically to the other two
(e.g., one word corresponds to a reptile while the others are related to
mammals).
3Other types of Captchas, such as hybrid combinations and interaction-based
Captchas, are rarely addressed in the literature.
4http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/are-you-robot-introducing-no-
captcha.html
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Audio-based Originally designed to overcome accessibility problems of vi-
sually impaired people, audio-based Captchas rely on sound or speech
recognition by humans. The audio sequence is generally composed of
a set of words to be identified, layered on top of background noise as
distortion (see Figure B.1b).
Many of today’s audio-based Captchas are not considered to be user-
friendly [13, 10]. For example, in a study with 89 blind participants,
only 43% were successful in solving ten popular audio-based Captchas
Bigham and Cavender [10].
Image-based Users are asked to perform an image recognition task, for
example to distinguish an object or idea from a picture, by recognizing
facial features of a human face, or to identify the upright orientation of
an image. Image-based Captchas rely on the so called “semantic gap”
between humans and machines, according to which humans naturally
outperform algorithms in extracting information from given images
[82]. One example for an image-based Captcha is Microsoft’s ASIRRA
(see Figure B.1c), which prompts users to identify all cats out of a
set of twelve photographs of both cats and dogs. Another example is
Confident CAPTCHA [23], which asks users to click on all images that
show a given type of symbols, such as cats, birds or aircrafts.
Image-based Captchas, such as ASIRRA, have the particular advan-
tage that, unlike text-based Captchas, they can be used across linguis-
tic boundaries.
Interaction-based Captchas are a subtype of image-based Captchas.
These Captchas address the human ability to logically perceive com-
plex images and to perform a task based on perception, such as clicking
on the mountaintop or putting a randomly rotated image back to its
upright position [6, 42].
Video-based Video-based Captchas rely on the assumption that only hu-
mans can extract complex information out of video-clips. Thus, these
Captchas prompt users to either describe in some words what hap-
pens in a video (see Figure B.1d) or to type in the slogan from a video
advertisement.
2.2. Usability and security
Having defined usability as “how intuitive and easy the Captcha is for
all users”, we operationalize the construct of usability for the purpose of
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measurement, as previously suggested in ISO 9241-115 and in [44, 66, 98]6:
1. Effectiveness Effectiveness usually subsumes both, FPs and FNs of
Captchas. In the context of usability, only FPs are relevant. We
refer to FPs as errors and to FP rates as error rates in the following.
Ahmad et al. [1] suggest that humans should be able to successfully
solve the Captcha at a rate of 90% or above, i.e., to ensure adequate
usability, error rates should not exceed 10%.
2. Efficiency The time for solving a Captcha (either correctly or incor-
rectly) represents an important usability parameter. According to Rui
and Liu [75], 30 seconds are considered to be the approximate limit
beyond which the efficiency of a Captcha and therefore its usability
declines dramatically.
3. Learnability This criterion refers to how easy it is for users to accom-
plish basic tasks when they encounter a design for the first time [67].
The more intuitive a Captcha is, the easier and faster it can be learned.
4. Satisfaction The user’s overall satisfaction is a subjective indicator of
his/her acceptance of the Captcha procedure. The acceptance, in turn,
affects the user’s willingness to use web services that grant access by
means of the respective Captcha.
The security analysis of Captchas can address different aspects. The
following security requirements are proposed in the literature [16, 94, 100]:
5. Media security Media (images, audio sequences etc.) should be ob-
fuscated before being presented to the user. For example, texts and
audio sequences should be distorted. Otherwise, Captchas become eas-
ily vulnerable to attacks performed with text recognition tools, speech
recognition tools, etc. [14].
Media security can be compromised through machine-learning attacks.
Secure Captchas should prevent machine-learning attacks or at least
make them hard to perform [100].
5This ISO standard suggests that usability measures should cover effectiveness, effi-
ciency and satisfaction.
6Nielsen [66] also mentions memorability as a usability parameter. However, measuring
memorability requires a long-term experimental setup where participants are tracked over
a longer period of time. As we implemented a short-term experimental setup, memorability
could not be tested.
6
6. Script security Captcha systems should ensure that there are no easy
ways to solve Captchas at the script level. Common examples for com-
promised security are those where the answer to the Captcha challenge
is passed in plain text or where a solution to a Captcha challenge can
be used multiple times (the Captcha is then vulnerable to replay at-
tacks).
7. Algorithmic/randomness security Captcha challenges must be gen-
erated and evaluated automatically [91]. For this automated process,
Captchas rely on random algorithms. The literature shows that the
security of Captchas depends on a strong algorithmic randomness of
the Captcha challenges used [14, 100].
8. Security after wide-spread adoption Captchas should be secure
even after a significant number of websites adopt them. This require-
ment may be violated, for example, when a text-based question is
asked, such as a mathematical question like “what is 1+1”. A parser
could easily be written that would allow bots to bypass this test.
2.3. Literature findings
In order to identify the state-of-the-art of Captcha-related security and
usability research, we performed a literature review. Our literature search
process is described in Appendix A. The results of our review are presented
in Table B.1, which shows the contributions of the literature for each of the
five Captcha types presented in Subsection 2.1. We analyze each paper with
regard to which particular usability and security criterion is covered.
In total, we found 18 papers that address usability issues of Captchas
and 38 papers that are dedicated to security aspects. As Table B.1 indicates,
research has focused on four clusters: 1) Security of text-based Captchas,
2) Usability of text-based Captchas, 3) Security of image-based Captchas
and 4) Usability of audio-based Captchas. The usability of image-based
Captchas has heretofore been largely neglected.
3. Development of two face recognition Captchas: Farett-Gender
and Farett-Gender&Age
In this section, we propose two novel face recognition Captchas (Farett-
Gender and Farett-Gender&Age), which are based on gender and age clas-
sification. Before presenting the Captchas, we discuss the state-of-the-art of
gender and age classification in the literature on Captchas.
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3.1. Gender and age classification for Captchas
Both gender and age classification are challenging and interesting prob-
lems in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) and have attracted much at-
tention by researchers in recent years, particularly with regard to the rise of
surveillance technology [55].
Gender-based classification As acknowledged widely in the literature,
the accuracy of gender recognition algorithms strongly depends on the
quality of images. To be precise, gender recognition of uncontrolled,
real-world images, i.e., of non-frontal, poorly lit faces, has been con-
sidered an unsolved problem in AI research [4, 38, 79]. The security
of Farret-Gender is based on this gap of accuracy between machines
and humans in recognizing gender. To estimate how well machines
would perform on Farret-Gender, we consider studies that evaluate
the accuracy of gender recognition algorithms on real-world images.
Unfortunately, most studies classify faces taken under controlled con-
ditions: for example, Ma¨kinen and Raisamo [55] test methods for au-
tomated gender classification and achieve a gender recognition rate of
89% on average. However, it should be noticed that a face database
was used with pictures taken under controlled lighting and positioning
conditions. In another study, Shan [79] achieves a recognition rate of
up to 94.81% with an improvement of current classification algorithms.
The study is based on a picture database which was previously cleared
of unfavorable images, such as not (near) frontal ones. According to
Shan, this step was necessary because otherwise the classification al-
gorithms would have performed much worse. Studies classifying more
realistic images use images which are not publicly available [38, 78] or
they do not transparently select a subset of publicly available images
[79]. While many of these studies show how well algorithms can per-
form on high quality images taken in controlled environments, some
studies also indicate under which circumstances the algorithms per-
form suboptimally. For example, the recognition rates drop to ap-
proximately (i) 60% for some ethnicities [38], (ii) 70% for a majority
of the age groups [26], (iii) 70-80% for female subsets [30] and (iv)
75% for more realistic images [78]. There is further evidence for the
difference between humans and machines in recognizing gender: those
faces that were misclassified [26] or excluded [79] in the studies could
easily be classified by humans. On the one hand, some authors report
recognition rates in excess of 90% [79] and recent studies show that
for some real-world images, similar success rates are possible [17, 86].
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On the other hand, the studies and examples presented above indicate
that current AI-based methods must be expected to perform worse if
the images presented by Farret-Gender are not taken under controlled
conditions or if they are distorted, for example.
To determine how accurately gender recognition tools classify the im-
ages used in our study, we selected the state-of-the-art gender recog-
nition tool provided by Project Oxford7 and classified a set of 500
(undistorted) images from Labeled Faces in the Wild [87, 48, 47], which
includes all images used in our usability study. We also classified a set
of 220 frontal faces from the Color FERET Database [72, 71], which
contains high-quality images taken under controlled conditions. The
gender recognition tool achieved a success rate of 87.6% on the images
from Labeled Faces in the Wild and 96.8% on the images from the
Color FERET Database. These results provide further evidence and
show that machines are much less accurate in gender recognition when
low-quality and uncontrolled images are used (compared to classifying
high-quality and controlled images). This supports our assumption
that, in the presence of uncontrolled images, humans capability of
gender recognition is still superior to that of machines.
Age-based classification Geng and Smith-Miles [39] show that age classi-
fication can be performed by algorithms with a mean absolute error of
5.36 years. Human evaluators achieved a mean absolute error of 8.13
(only gray-scale face regions are shown) and 6.23 years (whole color
images are shown) in the same test environment. However, the inter-
pretation of these results needs to consider that a) these experiments,
again, rely upon databases with face pictures that were mostly taken
under controlled conditions, including the use of frontal images, and b)
no information on the human evaluators is provided (e.g., how much
time did they have?) and c) only 29 human evaluators participated.
We assume that under realistic, uncontrolled conditions, algorithms
perform worse than reported by Geng and Smith-Miles [39]. Horng
et al. [45] suggest an age group classification method based on neu-
ral networks, which shows an average success rate of q = 78.13% for
gray-scale facial images when three age groups (“young”, “middle”
and “old”) are used (p. 190); further studies are reported by Fu et al.
[36], who indicate that age classification of non-frontal images remains
7https://www.projectoxford.ai/demo/face#detection
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an open problem.
We assume that the human brain is superior to computers in performing
age and gender classification tasks in terms of accuracy. Thus, we pro-
pose two novel Captchas, Farett-Gender and Farett-Gender&Age, which are
based on gender and age classification. We then analyze their security and
usability.
3.2. Farett-Gender and Farett-Gender&Age
Figure B.2 shows the Captcha Farett-Gender8, which is based on gender
classification. It prompts the user with faces (n = 20), among which exactly
k = 5 faces are corresponding to the same gender, which is selected arbi-
trarily. The user has two options: s/he can either click on five images and
then press the submit button, or s/he can press the reload button to get a
new set of pictures. The option to request a new challenge is widely used in
today’s Captchas.
Our second Captcha, Farett-Gender&Age, requires the user to sequen-
tially perform two classification tasks, gender and age classification. It
prompts the user with n = 16 images. In a first step, the user needs to
click on three images of a given gender (see Figure B.3). The user’s options
are similar to those available for Farett-Gender. If task 1 has been completed
correctly, the user needs to mark the youngest person of the three selected
pictures (see Figure B.4), then s/he need to mark the oldest one. The order
of ages varies and is determined randomly.
The number of pictures used in the Farett Captchas is based on the
following rationale. First, we considered the implementation of similar, es-
tablished Captchas. For example, ASIRRA uses a number of twelve differ-
ent pictures. With this set of images, the authors of ASIRRA claim their
Captcha to have a combinatorial breaking probability of 0.2% [31]. Con-
sidering an attack based on learning classification algorithms increases this
probability to 10.3%, according to Golle [40]. Thus, the number of twelve
images can be considered as a minimum with which a sufficient level of
security can be ensured. In addition, we took into account the feedback
of a small pre-test group of six participants, who were asked to evaluate
Farett Captchas which showed different numbers of images regarding us-
ability. Based on their feedback, the number of pictures should not exceed
8 The experiments were conducted in German. All screenshots in this paper show
translated versions.
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25. We decided to use for both Farett Captchas a single number of im-
ages for the following reason: As we apply a within-subject design in our
study, using several values for the number n of images, or even the entire
range, would probably lead to a high drop-out rate because of the efforts
required by the participants. We decided to select n = 20 and n = 16 for
Farett-Gender and the more complex Farett-Gender&Age, respectively, with
these values being a trade-off between a low drop-out rate and an acceptable
security level.
4. Security of Farett-Gender and Farett-Gender&Age
Regardless of the usability of our Captcha procedures, they have to be
sufficiently secure. We evaluate how secure our proposed Captchas are with
regard to those two types of attacks which are commonly considered in the
literature [7; 99, p.158]: brute-force attacks and attacks based on artificial
intelligence (AI).
In the following analysis, we consider an attacker who solves a single
instance of a particular Captcha C with probability θC . Trying to solve any
of i given Captcha instances, an attacker succeeds with probability
p = 1− (1− θC)i . (1)
Captchas which can be solved by a machine - i.e., by a brute-force or AI-
based attack - with a probability in excess of 1% are commonly considered
insecure in the literature [14, 20, 37].
Let us now consider the security of Google’s reCAPTCHA - both, as an
example, and as a benchmark for our Captchas. When a Captcha challenge
presents a text of length n with each single character drawn from a set of m
characters, the probability of success of a brute-force attack amounts to
θreCAPTCHA =
1
mn
. (2)
For example, if a text contains seven characters, with each character
being either a digit, a lower case letter or an upper case letter, then the
attacker’s probability of guessing correctly equals 1
627
≈ 2.84 · 10−13. Even
without considering the challenge of guessing the number of characters pre-
sented by the Captcha, this is well below the threshold of 1%.
With regard to AI-based attacks, a wide range of success rates has been
reported for different versions of reCAPTCHA: 4.9% [20], 11.6% [5], 24.7%
[29], 31% [46], 40% [25, 83], and even 55% [83].
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4.1. Farett-Gender
In a brute-force attack on Farret-Gender, an attacker has to guess k
images out of a set of n images, from a combinatorial perspective. Thus,
s/he needs to guess one solution out of
(
n
k
)
options, resulting in an attacker’s
success probability (FN rate) of
θFarret−Gender =
1(
n
k
) = k!(n− k)!
n!
. (3)
This amounts to approximately 0.00645% = 6.45 · 10−5 for n = 20 and
k = 5, which can be considered secure.
When an attacker uses an AI-based gender determination algorithm to
break a Farret-Gender instance, s/he does not need to determine the gender
of each of the n = 20 persons correctly in order so succeed. For example,
when an attacker applies the AI-based algorithm to each of the 20 images
and yields k = 6 images which are classified as those of a given gender, five of
these images may be correctly classified and one misclassified. In this case,
the attacker can guess which of the six images was misclassified, resulting
in a chance of about 16.67%. In our analysis, we assume that sophisticated
AI-based algorithms are robust with regard to gender determination, i.e.,
the probability p with which the algorithm correctly determines the gender
of a person shown on an image may vary slightly but does not substantially
depend on the particular image. As a consequence, sorting probabilities
computed for the n images in descending order and selecting the first k im-
ages is not promising. Assuming a constant probability p for automatically
determining the gender of a person shown on an image, allows to compute
the overall probability θ
′
Farett-Gender with which an attacker succeeds in
breaking a Farret-Gender instance using an AI-based gender determination
algorithm. Addressing the general case (correctly select k out of n images),
we yield
θ
′
Farett−Gender =
1(
n
k
) · [k−1∑
i=0
(1− p)k−i · pn−k+i ·
(
n
i
)
+
n−k∑
j=0
(1− p)n−k−j · pk+j ·
(
n
j
) . (4)
It should be noticed that, for p = 1, θ
′
Farett−Gender equals 1. A proof of
equation (4) is provided in Appendix B. For different accuracy levels (p) of
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AI-based gender detection algorithms, Tables B.2-B.4 show how the param-
eters n and k need to be adjusted in order to keep the overall probability of
a successful attack on Farret-Gender under a given threshold. Taking into
account the state-of-the art of gender-recognition algorithms (see Subsection
3.1), we perform computations for p = 80%, 85% and 90%.
The tables show that, for each value of p, the success probabilities for the
cases (n = 20, k = 9) and (n = 20, k = 11) are identical as a) in the latter
case 11 images of a given gender, or 9 images of the opposite gender, have
to be identified and b) the probability of correctly identifying the gender of
a person does not depend on the particular gender.
In our experimental setting (n = 20, k = 5), for example, the success
probability amounts to 2.54% for p = 80%; in order to decrease the success
probability to a value lower than an acceptable 1% (see discussion above),
the numbers of images shown and images to select (n, k) should be slightly
increased to (26, 5), (24, 7), (23, 9), or (23, 11), with n being at an acceptable
level of about 25. With p = 85% the numbers of n and k would need to be
increased to (37, 5), (33, 7), (32, 9), or (31, 11); with p = 90% the numbers of
n and k would need to be increased to (57, 5), (52, 7), (49, 9), or (48, 11). In
both cases, the number n of images needed to keep the attacker’s success
probability below 1% exceeds 25.
To sum up, our analysis reveals that Farett-Gender is secure with regard
to brute force attacks. Concerning AI-based attacks, algorithms showing a
gender-recognition success rate of above 80% would threaten the security of
Farett-Gender as the number of images presented to a user should presum-
ably not exceed 25 based on the feedback of a small pre-test group of six
participants (see Subsection 3.2). Due to the very small size of this group,
the maximum number of pictures that will be accepted by users would need
to be substantiated and distinguished according to user characteristics, such
as Internet and computer experience, age, cultural background etc., in fu-
ture research. Unless the accepted number of pictures cannot be increased
to a level of more than 30 pictures, e.g., by other ways in which images
are presented to the user, the proposed Farett Captchas cannot be both se-
cure and usable. Yet, beyond the option to increase the number of pictures,
there are several countermeasures for maintaining and improving the robust-
ness against AI-based attacks, such as image-distortion and deidentification
[28, 9]. However, new empirical studies beyond those in this work would be
required in order to assess the usability of such Farett-Gender instances.
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4.2. Farett-Gender&Age
The Captcha Farett-Gender&Age can be subject to a more diverse range
of attacks and therefore requires a more elaborate security analysis. We
assume in the following that the number k of images to select and finally to
sort according to age equals 3. We believe that users are not willing to sort
more than three images as sorting is a more challenging task than separately
classifying images (as required in the gender task). However, our analysis
can be straightforwardly extended to arbitrary values of k.
From a conceptual perspective, either of the tasks of classifying age and
gender can be conducted through guessing (brute force) or through using
AI methods, resulting in four combinations:
1. (Gender: brute-force, age: brute-force) Drawing on our security analy-
sis of Farett-Gender, the probability of guessing a Farett-Gender&Age
instance correctly amounts to
θFarett−Gender&Age =
3!(n− 3)!
n!
· 1
3!
=
(n− 3)!
n!
. (5)
Having n = 16 images in our experimental setting, an attacker’s suc-
cess probability is approximately 0.03%, which is acceptably low.
2. (Gender: brute-force, age: AI-based)
As in the case of gender classification, AI algorithms have been pro-
posed and tested for age classification (see Subsection 3.1). Let q
denote the probability with which an AI algorithm correctly assigns
an image to an age group (e.g., “young” or “old”). The result of or-
dering three images according to their age group can lead to 23 cases
as each of the 3 images is either classified correctly or not. One case is
characterized by correctly classifying all three images; this case occurs
with probability q3.
In
(
3
1
)
= 3 cases, exactly one image is misclassified. The probability
of each of these cases equals q2 · (1− q). Now the attacker faces a case
in which two images are assigned to the same age group. S/he has to
guess and we assume that s/he guesses correctly with a probability of
50%. Overall, the success probability of the cases amounts to 32 · q2 ·
(1− q).
In
(
3
2
)
= 3 cases, exactly two images are misclassified. The probability
of each of these cases equals q · (1− q)2. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the attacker misclassifies the images that show the young
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and the old person; there are 4 possibilities of this misclassification
(we assume they are equally distributed) as each of the 2 images can
be misclassified in 2 ways. Only when both images are misclassified
as “middle”, the attacker can succeed. In this situation, the attacker
has to guess the correct assignment of images to age groups out of
3! = 6 possible assignments. Overall, the success probability of the
cases amounts to 18 · q · (1− q)2.
Finally, in one case all three images are misclassified with probability
(1 − q)3. In this case, the attacker fails regardless of the age groups
assigned to the three images.
To sum up, using an AI-based age classification of three images an
attacker succeeds with probability
q3 +
3
2
· q2 · (1− q) + 1
8
· q · (1− q)2. (6)
Overall, the probability of guessing a Farett-Gender&Age instance cor-
rectly amounts to
θ
′
Farett−Gender&Age =
3!(n− 3)!
n!
·
(
q3 +
3
2
· q2 · (1− q) + 1
8
· q · (1− q)2
)
.
(7)
Having n = 16 images and assuming a very high accuracy of AI-
methods (q = 95%), an attacker’s success probability is approximately
0.17%, which is acceptably low.
3. (Gender: AI-based, age: brute-force) Assuming that gender classifica-
tion can be performed with accuracy p, an attacker can break a single
Farett-Gender&Age instance with probability
θ
′′
Farett−Gender&Age = θ
′
Farett−Gender ·
1
3!
=
(n− 3)!
n!
·
[
2∑
i=0
(1− p)3−i · pn−3+i ·
(
n
i
)
+
n−3∑
j=0
(1− p)n−3−j · p3+j ·
(
n
j
) . (8)
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Table B.5 shows the probabilities with which an attacker succeeds.
The values in Table B.5 show that in our experimental setting (n =
16, k = 3), the success probability amounts to 1.26% for p = 80%;
in order to decrease the success probability to a value lower than an
acceptable 1%, the number n of images should be increased to 18. For
more accurate AI-based gender detection algorithms (p = 85% and
p = 90%), n would need to be increased to 25 and 40, respectively.
4. (Gender: AI-based, age: AI-based) When an attackers draws on AI-
based methods for both gender classification and age classification, the
success rate per Farett-Gender&Age instance amounts to
θ
′′′
Farett−Gender&Age = θ
′
Farett−Gender ·
(
q3 +
3
2
· q2 · (1− q) + 1
8
· q · (1− q)2
)
=
1(
n
3
) · [ 2∑
i=0
(1− p)3−i · pn−3+i ·
(
n
i
)
+
n−3∑
j=0
(1− p)n−3−j · p3+j ·
(
n
j
)
·
(
q3 +
3
2
· q2 · (1− q) + 1
8
· q · (1− q)2
)
. (9)
In our case (n = 16), the success rate of an attacker amounts to
approximately 5.35%, 11.33% and 23.75% for p = q = 80%, p = q =
85% and p = q = 90%, respectively. Table B.6 shows the probabilities
with which an attacker succeeds.
In order to decrease the success probability to a value lower than an
acceptable 1%, the number n of images shown needs to be increased
to 31, 45 and 73 for p = q = 80%, p = q = 85% and p = q = 90%,
respectively. When users are not willing to classify more than 25 im-
ages, we conclude that for p, q ≥ 80%, Farett-Gender&Age is insecure
against AI-based attacks on both gender and age classification.
To sum up, our analysis of Farett-Gender&Age reveals that it is (1) se-
cure against brute force attacks on both gender and age recognition, (2)
secure against brute force attacks on gender recognition and “realistic”
AI-based attacks on age recognition (even when the age-recognition rate
amounts to a rate as high as 95%), secure against against AI-based attacks
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on gender recognition and brute force attacks on age recognition if the gen-
der recognition rate p does not exceed 85% and the number of images shown
is increased to 25, and secure against AI-based attacks on both gender and
age classification unless age- and gender-recognition rates exceed 80% and
users are not willing to classify more than 25 images.
It should be noticed that regarding age classification with AI-based algo-
rithms, beyond the option to separately assign each of the presented images
to one age class and then to select the youngest or oldest person, an at-
tacker can also look for AI-based algorithms which rank a given set of faces
according to the age and then select the oldest or youngest person based on
comparisons. However, we are not aware of any study that analyzes how
well this task can be performed with AI-based algorithms.
5. Usability study of the proposed Captchas
The main purpose of our study is the empirical evaluation of the proposed
Farett Captchas against each other and against state-of-the-art Captchas in
terms of usability. In order to keep the efforts for the participants of our
study manageable and the drop-out rate low (this issue becomes particu-
larly important when using a within-subject design, which we use for the
advantages explained below), we decided to limit the number of Captchas
to four. In addition to the two proposed Captchas, we use the two Captchas
reCAPTCHA (see Figure B.1a) and KCAPTCHA (see Figure B.5) as bench-
marks for two reasons:
1. Both Captchas are well-known, text-based reverse Turing tests. re-
CAPTCHA currently the most widely used Captcha, serving about
100 million Captchas instances each day [41].
2. For both Captchas, a public interface is provided, which allows for an
efficient integration into our experimental environment.
We would have preferred noCaptcha, which was introduced recently by
Google, as a benchmark for usability. However, this was not possible for
two reasons: (1) Our pretests showed that it is impossible to reliably have
participants solve more than two instances of noCaptcha. The reason is that
users are prompted with the original, text-based reCaptcha as a fallback
when they solve multiple instances of noCaptcha. This prevents us from
gathering enough data for determining reliable statistics on usability, the
time required for solving the Captcha and its error-rates. (2) Furthermore,
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as noCaptcha is not a Turing test in a sense that it implements a challenge-
response procedure, it is impossible to isolate the time needed to solve the
Captcha, i.e., to measure its efficiency.
To compare the four Captchas, we follow the recommendation of Nielsen
[66, pp. 178] and implement a within-subject design in which every par-
ticipant has to solve all four Captchas. The advantage of a within subject
design is that it yields a higher statistical power than a between-subject de-
sign with the same number of participants9. In addition, the error variances
associated with individual differences are reduced. We assume that carry-
over effects10 - i.e., practice and fatigue, which are common shortcomings
of within-subject designs - do not seriously affect our results. In general,
the practice effect might mean that the participants are more confident and
accomplished after the first test because they gained experience. In our
case, practice is unlikely to be an issue, as all of the four Captchas pose
straightforward tasks to the participants and, according to our pretest, we
expected the participants of our final study to be well familiar with PCs,
Internet usage and Captchas in general. With regard to fatigue11, we argue
that this is not a severe issue because in our pilot study, most of the par-
ticipants took just a few minutes to complete all tests 12. To sum up, our
study was neither intellectually challenging nor time-consuming for partici-
pants so that carryover effects, if any occur, are probably minor. To control
carryover effects, we change the order in which the four Captcha procedures
are presented to the participants (counterbalancing, cf. Subsection 5.3).
As participants needed only a web browser, it was possible to conduct
the study as a pure online test. Although online tests do not provide the
same controlled environment as laboratory experiments, their advantages
are an easier acquisition of participants, no need for laboratory space, and
a more natural environment, which ensures a higher validity of results.
We conducted a pilot study with six participants and we interviewed
them in order to test the design of the web-based study and the design of
9We would need to get twice (four times) as many participants as in the within-
subject design if we tested the established Captchas and the newly proposed Captchas in
two groups (each of the four Captchas in a different group).
10A carryover effect occurs when preceding tests adversely influence succeeding tests;
i.e., the order of tests has an impact on results.
11Participants may become exhausted, bored or simply disinterested after taking part
in multiple tests.
12In our empirical study, the mean time was 4:17 min, with a standard deviation of
1:15 min.
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our Farett Captchas, including the number of images that are presented.
In the remainder of this section, we describe details of our study with
regard to the participants, the usability measures, the image data, and the
protocol13.
5.1. Participants
We recruited 151 participants using the following communication chan-
nels:
• the mailing list of the WKWI, which is the German-speaking information
systems community,
• Facebook groups of information system students,
• the web sites of the authors’ research group and of our Faculty,
• lists of email addresses of information system students at the University
of Regensburg, and
• colleagues of the authors.
We removed datasets from participants who either did not complete the
test (26 participants) or took extremely long (7 participants) so that their
results were assumed to be invalid. The latter were treated as outliers and
removed when the overall time they needed to complete the test exceeded
209 seconds (µ+3×σ) [13]. This resulted in a sample ofN = 118 participants
(96 men and 22 women), aged between 17 and 60.
Participation was voluntary and no compensation was provided to at-
tract only those participants who were interested in the study itself rather
than in getting benefits. In the survey, participants were not only asked
for demographic information but also for their experience with comput-
ers. Regarding the time, participants spend on the Internet (per day), we
found an almost uniform (discrete) distribution up to seven hours, with 13
participants (11%) spending more than seven hours online. The perceived
computer related knowledge of many participants was high (91% rated their
knowledge between 7 and 10). Apparently, most of the participants are
young and male adults with good computer skills. Table B.7 shows charac-
teristics of the participants.
13Our institution does not require Institutional Review Board approval for human-
based studies.
10x-y means: x hour(s) ≤ Internet usage < y hours.
11One participant did not answer the question.
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5.2. Image data
For both Captcha methods, we used the database Labeled Faces in the
Wild [87, 48, 47], which is constantly growing. When we conducted the
study, this database contained a total of 13,233 color portraits of various
people of all ages. All images in the database were randomly collected from
the Internet using the Viola-Jones face detection algorithm [88]. The secu-
rity of Farett benefits from this random selection because shooting conditions
and face rotation vary greatly.
5.3. Protocol
The study consists of three phases and it was designed as a web-based
online test; we hosted all web pages and server applications on our own
servers. In the first phase, we welcomed and introduced the participant
on a starting page, which briefly explains the purpose of the study, pro-
vides the estimated time required for finishing the test (five minutes, based
on our pretest results), informs about the tasks s/he has to solve (solve
five instances of each of four different Captchas), and provides links to a
short introduction to Captchas12 and to the websites of reCAPTCHA13 and
KCAPTCHA14. However, following these links is not mandatory to be able
to do understand the study and the required tasks. The main purpose is to
provide background information to those who are interested.
In the second phase, the participant has to solve five instances of each of
the Captcha types reCAPTCHA, KCAPTCHA, Farett-Gender, and Farett-
Gender&Age, with different orders being used (counterbalancing). We apply
the 4x4 Latin Square design, as suggested by Mitchell and Jolley [60, p.
542], according to which participants are assigned to one of the four groups
shown in Table B.8. The assignment of participants to groups follows a
cycle: participant 1 is assigned to group 1, participant 2 to group 2 etc.,
and participant 5 to group 1 etc. The instances of all Captcha types are
generated randomly so that participants get different Captcha instances.
Using different instances for each participant improves robustness of results
against any bias introduced through a (too) small set of Captcha instances.
A participant first has to solve five instances of the Captcha type of
his/her group, then s/he is asked to evaluate the Captcha. Based on the
suggestions of Penninger et al. [70] and Nielsen [66], s/he has to respond to
12http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAPTCHA
13http://www.google.com/recaptcha
14http://www.captcha.ru/en/kcaptcha
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each of the following questions on a scale from 1 (very bad / hard) to 10
(very good / easy).15
1. How easy was it for you to solve this Captcha?
2. As how intuitive did this Captcha appear to you?
3. What is your overall impression about this Captcha?
The participant then has to solve five instances of the second, third and
fourth Captcha type of his/her group and answer the usability questions
presented above. For each Captcha instance, the participant has the option
to either solve the instance or to load a new instance; this option is usually
available for state-of-the-art Captchas.
We now describe how each of the four Captcha types are presented to the
participants. For the generation of reCAPTCHA instances, we used the web
interface provided by Google, which randomly generates Captchas. Figure
B.6 shows a screenshot of a reCAPTCHA instance as it is presented to the
participant.
For KCAPTCHA, we used the free Captcha generator provided on the
project website.16 Figure B.7 shows a screenshot of a KCAPTCHA instance
as it is presented to the participant.
In contrast to the previously tested Captchas, which are probably known
to many participants, Farett-Gender is new to the participant and needs to
be explained. Thus, we provided a text description and the opportunity
to watch a short demonstration video (35 seconds) that shows how Farett-
Gender works. We then asked the participant to solve instances of Farett-
Gender (see Figure B.2).
The generation of Farett-Gender instances proceeds as follows: From
the database Labeled Faces in the Wild (cf. Subsection 5.2), we randomly
selected 89 male and 89 female pictures and manually classified them as
either male or female. We also manually classified all 178 pictures as either
“young”, “middle”, “old” or “no class”, with the latter being used for those
15The experiments were conducted in German. All questions reported in this paper are
translated versions. We decided to not use the System Usability Scale (SUS) suggested
in [11] with its ten questions for two reasons: First, using ten questions for four Captchas
would each user require to answer 40 questions, in addition to solving several Captcha
instances. We believe that these efforts would have increased the drop-out rate of users
participating in our experiment substantially. Second, not all questions of SUS are appli-
cable to our experiment. For example, the question “I found the various functions in this
system were well integrated.” is meaningless in our experimental setting.
16See http://www.captcha.ru/en/kcaptcha/
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images where age classification might lead to ambiguous results. Overall, we
classified 18, 21 and 25 images showing young, middle and old male persons,
respectively, and we yielded 17, 28 and 20 images showing young, middle
and old female persons, respectively. Based on these pre-classified images,
Farett-Gender instances are generated in four phases (all of the selections
are conducted at random): (I) a gender is selected, (II) from the set of 89
images of the selected gender, five images are selected, (III) the remaining
15 images are selected from the opposite gender and (IV) the 20 images are
arranged in a rectangle.
For Farett-Gender&Age, we provided a textual explanation as well as the
option to watch a short demonstration video (24 seconds) that shows how
Farett-Gender&Age works. We then asked the participant to solve instances
of Farett-Gender&Age (see Figures B.3 and B.4). The generation of Farett-
Gender instances is similar to the procedure described above (all of the
selections are conducted at random): (I) a gender is selected, (II) for the
selected gender and each of the age groups “young”, “middle” and “old”,
one image is selected, (III) the remaining twelve images are selected from
the opposite gender, regardless of age and (IV) the 15 images are arranged
in a rectangle.
In the third and final phase, the participant completes a questionnaire
containing demographic items and measures pertaining to Internet usage
and PC knowledge as suggested by Fidas et al. [34].
5.4. Measures
As suggested in Subsection 2.2, we use the following metrics to evaluate
both, the objective performance and the perceived quality of the Captchas:
Effectiveness To measure effectiveness, we track the error rate of partici-
pants for each Captcha; reloaded (and thus unsolved) Captchas do not
affect error rates. The error rates are defined as follows:
error rate =
#errors
#solved
where #solved is the number of instances presented to the participant
(in our case, five instances).
Efficiency To measure efficiency, we track the time a participant needs to
solve a Captcha instance; more precisely, we measure the time period
between the points of time when the instance is presented and the par-
ticipant clicks on the “Submit” button. Thus, the time for reloading
Captcha instances is not included.
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Learnability In Section 2.2, we define learnability as how easy it is for users
to accomplish a task when they encounter a design for the first time.
Since it is difficult to measure learnability directly, we ask participants
for their subjective impression (on a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent));
they had to answer two questions: How easy was it for you to solve
this Captcha?, As how intuitive did this Captcha appear to you? We
then calculate the mean of both values.
Satisfaction We measure satisfaction by asking the participants to express
their overall impression about a certain Captcha on a scale from 1
(poor) to 10 (excellent); we use a third question as already mentioned
in the protocol description: What is your overall impression about this
Captcha? This measure can be considered as an aggregate of perceived
effectiveness, perceived efficiency, and perceived learnability.
6. Usability results
We evaluate the tested Captcha procedures (Farett-Gender, Farett-
Age&Gender, reCAPTCHA and KCAPTCHA) with regard to the four us-
ability criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, learnability and satisfaction). For
each of these criteria, we have one sample (of size N = 118) per Captcha
procedure. The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the samples (over all four
criteria) are not normally distributed (at the .01-level). As a consequence,
we applied the nonparametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test [80,
pp. 609] to compare the criteria. We use the one-tailed test in those cases
where the distribution of difference scores in the populations represented
by the two samples is not symmetric about the median of the population
of different scores. Otherwise, two-tailed tests were conducted. Table B.9
provides an overview of the statistical results. To avoid confusion, we show
only results of one-paired tests in Table B.9 - the (few) results of two-paired
tests are reported in the text.
6.1. Effectiveness
We assess effectiveness in terms of error rates (cf. Figure B.8). As
each participant had to solve exactly five instances of each Captcha, error
rates get values of the set {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}. Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks tests indicate that KCAPTCHA has higher error rates than
the other Captchas. Farett-Gender&Age shows much higher error rates than
reCAPTCHA and Farett-Gender. Only two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks tests could be conducted; they indicate differences between the
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error rates of Farett-Gender&Age and Farett-Gender (V = 549.5, p < .001)
and between Farett-Gender&Age and reCAPTCHA (V = 936.5, p < .001).
6.2. Efficiency
We assess efficiency in terms of task completion times (cf. Figure B.9).
Although Figure B.9 suggests that the number of outliers is high, the per-
centage of outliers does not exceed 5% (for every Captcha, there are 590 ob-
servations: 118 participants·5 instances/participant). Furthermore, there is
no systematic pattern which distinguishes the outliers of the four Captchas.
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests indicate that KCAPTCHA in-
stances were solved quicker than reCAPTCHA (V = 5185, p < .001) in-
stances. These were solved quicker than Farett-Gender (V = 1044, p < .001)
instances, which, in turn, were solved quicker than Farett-Gender&Age
(V = 2551.5, p = .005) instances. We found the same relationships of
task completion times when we consider only times of successfully solved
Captcha instances. With regard to task completion times of unsuccessfully
solved Captcha instances, relationships are less clear: Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks tests indicate that participants require less time when
they (unsuccessfully) try to solve KCAPTCHA instances compared to the
time they require to (unsuccessfully) solve instances of any other Captcha
procedure. The superiority of reCAPTCHA over Farett-Gender is at the .04
level of significance but the sample size (N = 7) is low.
6.3. Learnability
Regarding learnability, which was calculated as the average of perceived
ease and perceived intuition, results are shown in Figure B.10. Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks tests indicate that Farett-Gender shows the
highest learnability17, and KCAPTCHA shows the lowest18.
6.4. Satisfaction
Regarding satisfaction, results are shown in Figure B.11. As in the case of
learnability, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests indicate that Farett-
Gender performs best. Specifically, Farett-Gender dominates reCAPTCHA
17Specifically, Farett-Gender dominates reCAPTCHA (V = 2052, p = .007),
KCAPTCHA (V = 950, p < .001) and Farett-Gender&Age (V = 3724, p < .001) with
regard to learnability.
18KCAPTCHA is dominated by reCAPTCHA (V = 579, p = .004), Farett-Gender
(V = 56, p < .001)) and Farett-Gender&Age (V = 224, p < .001) with regard to learnabil-
ity.
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(V = 1719, p = .003) and KCAPTCHA (V = 797.5, p < .001) with regard
to satisfaction.
7. Discussion
7.1. Security
The results of our security analysis show that Farett-Gender and Farett-
Gender&Age are secure against brute-force attacks. However, Farett-Gender
is secure against AI-based attacks on gender recognition unless success rates
exceed 80% and users are not willing to classify more then 25 images. While
Farett-Gender&Age is secure against attacks where AI-based algorithms are
applied to either age or gender recognition (as long as the success rate of
a gender-recognizing algorithm does not exceed 85%), it is secure against
AI-based attacks on both gender and age recognition unless age- and gender-
recognition rates exceed 80% and users are not willing to classify more than
25 images.
In order to achieve security against AI-based attacks on Farett-Gender
and Farett-Gender&Age, one option would be to increase the number of
images that users have to classify. Another option would be to use images
of lower quality (e.g., distorted images). As mentioned in Subsection 4.1, in
both cases new usability studies would be necessary as the conditions under
which users have to classify images change in terms of image quality and/or
numbers.
Besides these essential types of attacks, a few common security issues
should be anticipated when face recognition Captchas get adopted widely.
(i) When face-recognition Captchas are employed at large scale, applying
distortion techniques becomes necessary to counter attacks based on man-
ually pre-classifying images and using hashing algorithms to match the im-
ages presented by the Captcha with pre-classified images. In the literature,
such distortion techniques have already been applied to the image database,
Labeled Faces in the Wild, which was used in our implementation of Farett-
Gender and Farett-Gender&Age [9]. (ii) When the web server gets a high
number of submissions during an unusually short time period, there are well
established mechanisms to counter obvious attacks. First, the number of
Captcha submissions per IP address and time period could be limited. Sec-
ond, the submission of many Captcha solutions can be made more costly
by requiring the client to perform time-consuming calculations known as
hashcash [7]. Third, the web server could temporarily switch to a different
Captcha procedure that is more robust against guessing even if it is less
user-friendly.
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7.2. Usability
Our usability study compares the proposed face recognition Captchas
with text-based Captchas in terms of their objective quality (effectiveness
and efficiency) and in terms of their subjective quality (learnability and
satisfaction).
Considering effectiveness in terms of average error rates, we found that
Farett-Gender, reCAPTCHA and Farett-Gender&Age dominate KCaptcha.
Our results also indicate that there is no difference between the error rates
of our face recognition Captchas and reCAPTCHA. However, we would not
consider this finding conclusive, especially since other studies have reported
substantially higher error rates for reCAPTCHA. For example, Bursztein
et al. [13] measured an error rate of 25% in a large-scale study based on
Amazon Mechanical Turk, which suggests that further investigations might
confirm stronger, or even significant differences between the error rates of
Farett-Gender and reCAPTCHA.
The analysis of efficiency shows that participants needed more time for
solving our Captchas than for solving reCAPTCHA and KCAPCTHA. There
are two possible reasons why our Captchas are less efficient. First, high
task completion times can be based on the time-consuming challenge for
humans to determine gender and age of persons shown in a picture. Second,
they can also be due to the specific design and required user interactions in
our experiment. In this case, alternative designs may lead to an improved
efficiency.
With regard to learnability, Farett-Gender performs best, showing that
Farett-Gender is easy to use and intuitive. Interestingly, Farett-Gender per-
forms significantly better than reCAPTCHA, although the latter should
be known to most participants in contrast to Farett-Gender. Farett-
Gender&Age shows similar values as reCAPTCHA. Apparently, Farett-
Gender&Age is regarded less learnable than Farett-Gender, probably be-
cause of the additional age classification task.
The results of participants’ satisfaction with the four Captchas show
that the proposed Captchas are superior in this regard to the established
ones. With an average of 7.53 in satisfaction, Farret-Gender was rated
significantly better than reCAPTCHA (6.66) and KCaptcha (4.80). This
result is particularly relevant when customers’ satisfaction with the interface
of a web service affects the customers’ satisfaction with the web service itself.
Interestingly, lower efficiencies of Farett-Gender and Farett-Gender&Age do
not lead to an overall lower satisfaction with these Captcha procedures.
In summary, our usability study indicates that, while the results of ob-
jective performance measures are mixed, our Captchas are promising with
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regard to measures of perceived quality. They comprise tasks that are easy,
intuitive and that do not require any extraordinary knowledge. This makes
our Captchas applicable in a broad range of contexts. Face recognition
Captchas do not require a specific language or set of symbols, which would
constrain them to particular regions or speakers of particular languages - a
considerable advantage over today’s widely deployed text-based Captchas.
For example, Google’s reCAPTCHA uses Latin letters, which are hard to
perceive for users in, for example, China, Japan, Russia and Arabian coun-
tries. The fact that our Captchas do not require a keyboard makes them
suitable for mobile devices - if bandwidth is not an issue.
There are two settings, in which face recognition Captchas should not be
applied. In certain cultural contexts, it might be considered inappropriate
to show uncovered faces and both service providers and users might thus
be unwilling to use face recognition Captchas. Finally, alternative Captchas
should be provided for visually impaired users, who will find our Captchas
difficult to solve.
8. Summary and outlook
In this study, we proposed two novel face recognition Captchas, Farett-
Gender and Farett-Gender&Age. We showed analytically that the proposed
Captchas are secure with regard to brute-force and AI-based attacks unless
age and gender recognition rates are higher than 80% and users are not
willing to classify more than 25 images. Similar to the security of Captchas
in general, which is threatened by advances of AI-methods, the robustness
of our face recognition Captchas is affected by advances of face recognition
algorithms. Face recognition Captchas can be strengthened by increasing
the number of images, applying image distortion techniques and/or selecting
images which are difficult to classify.
We further evaluated the suggested face recognition procedures and two
text-based Captchas (reCaptcha and KCaptcha) in an empirical usability
study. To the best of our knowledge, this article describes the first empir-
ical usability study that compares image-based Captchas with text-based
Captchas. Our findings indicate that Farett-Gender is similar to the other
Captcha procedures concerning effectiveness, but it is less efficient; it is
superior with regard to learnability and satisfaction. The other proposed
Captcha Farett-Gender&Age performs worse than reCAPTCHA with regard
to effectiveness and efficiency and similarly well with regard to learnability
and satisfaction. To sum up, the proposed image-based Farett-Gender per-
forms better than the currently widely deployed reCAPTCHA. The other
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face recognition Captcha, Farett-Gender&Age, turned out to be less usable
which could be attributed to the fact that it is more complex.
As usability is an important indicator for the acceptance and deployment
of Captchas, we argue that our study should be used to intensify the design
and evaluation of Captcha procedures that are based on face recognition.
With regard to the application of the proposed Captchas in protecting real
resources on the web, a few implementation issues remain to be addressed.
Although the image data used to generate our Captchas was sufficient for
our proof of concept study, deploying the Captchas in a large-scale com-
mercial context would require a bigger set of images. In particular, these
images should not be publicly available to avoid attacks based on manu-
ally classifying the whole set of images. In addition, the set of images in
the database must be high as, otherwise, an attacker can collect as many
images as possible, label those by hand and automatically use the labeled
images in subsequent Captcha instances. However, composing a large im-
age database is challenging for the provider of an image-based Captcha as
each image needs to be pre-labeled manually. We see several options to get
images labeled: (1) Volunteers can help label images. (2) Associated web
services may be willing to embed label tasks in their processes. (3)Labeling
images may be rewarded with micropayments; for example, platforms for
human intelligence tasks, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, may be used.
With regard to research, our study has the following limitations, which
at the same time provide avenues for further investigation:
1. The usability results of our empirical study are based on Captcha in-
stances with less than 25 images. Our security analysis shows that
such instances are secure unless modern AI-based algorithms are used
to perform automated gender recognition. While our security analysis
reveals the relationship between the numbers of images shown, gen-
der recognition rates achieved by AI-based algorithms and the secu-
rity level of a Farett-Gender and Farett-Gender&Age instance, further
empirical studies are needed to assess the usability of instances when
images are altered in terms of number and/or quality.
2. We did not control for cultural issues. Different cultures may affect
the users’ willingness to distinguish pictures based on gender.
3. Our study and the findings are based on the particular designs of
Farett-Age and Farett-Age&Gender. As we did not implement and
test other designs and variations (parametrizations), such as a higher
number of pictures, we do not know how usability would be affected.
28
Such modifications of the proposed Captchas may become necessary
when methods of artificial intelligence improve and threaten to dimin-
ish the level of security provided by the Captchas.
4. Different facial attributes (cf. [52] for a comprehensive overview) could
serve as a basis for designing, implementing and evaluating further face
recognition Captchas.
5. As mentioned in Subsection 4.2, an attacker can use AI-based algo-
rithms not only for determining the age of given faces and then select-
ing the youngest or oldest one, s/he can also try to order a given set
of faces according to age and then select the youngest or oldest one
based on comparisons. Future research need to analyze to what extent
such attacks will affect the security of the proposed Farett Captchas.
6. In our empirical study, the proposed Captchas methods are compared
with text-based Captcha methods only. Further empirical research
is required to compare additional types of Captchas, including other
image-based Captchas, with the suggested methods.
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Appendix A. Literature search process
We searched the literature using two types of data sources. First, we con-
ducted a title search in pertinent journal and conference databases, namely
Business Premier Source, IEEE Explore and ACM Digital Library. We used
the search string “((CAPTCHA OR HIP19) and (usability OR accessibil-
ity OR security)) OR (face-recognition and (gender OR age))” and did not
19HIP abbreviates Human Interaction Proof.
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limit the search period. Second, we scanned the table of contents of journals
and conference proceedings for the period 2000-2014. We considered ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), Computers &
Security, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Security and Privacy, Journal of Information System Security (JISSEC), In-
ternational Journal of Information Security and Privacy (IJISP), Journal of
Computer Security and Journal of Information Security and Privacy.
Appendix B. Proof of equation (4)
Without loss of generality, we assume that an attacker has to identify
all k (out of n images) that show a female person. We further assume
that the probability of correct gender classification of each image is p. Let
Eij , i = 0, . . . , k; j = 0, . . . , (n − k), denote the event that the (AI-based
algorithm of an) attacker correctly classifies exactly i of k female persons
and correctly classifies exactly j of (n − k) male persons. The Eij events
partition the set of all possible events so that the success probabilities for
each of the Eij events add to the overall success probability θ
′
Farett−Gender
of an attacker. We now determine the success probabilities for all Eij in
increasing order of i.
Case i = 0: The probability of the occurrence of E0(n−k) equals (1−p)k ·
pn−k. In this case, all images are classified as male so that the attacker has
to select k out of n images at random. From the attacker’s perspective, all
of the
(
n
k
)
options are equally promising but only one option is the correct
one. Overall, the probability with which the attacker succeeds under the
event E0(n−k) equals
(1− p)k · pn−k · 1(n
k
) . (B.1)
In each event E0j , 0 ≤ j < (n − k), the attacker misclassifies at least
one male person as female and, at the same time, does not correctly classify
any of the female persons. Thus, the attacker chooses at least one of the
misclassified male persons and must finally fail. As a result, the success
probability amounts to zero.
Case i = 1: The probability of the occurrence of E1(n−k) equals
(1 − p)k−1 · pn−k+1 · (k1): There are (k1) options to select exactly one fe-
male person which is correctly classified, all other images are classified as
male. The correctly classified female person is selected by the attacker.
Then the attacker has to additionally select (k− 1) out of (n− 1) images at
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random. From the attacker’s perspective, again, all of the
(
n−1
k−1
)
options are
equally promising but only one option is correct. Overall, the probability
with which the attacker succeeds under the event E1(n−k) equals(
k
1
)
· (1− p)k−1 · pn−k+1 · 1(n−1
k−1
) . (B.2)
Analogously to case i = 0, in each event E1j , 0 ≤ j < (n − k), the
attacker misclassifies at least one male person as female and, at the same
time, correctly classifies only one of the female persons. Thus, the attacker
chooses at least one of the misclassified male persons and must fail (the
success probability equals zero).
Cases i = 2, . . . , (k − 1): These cases can be analyzed analogously
to the previous two cases. The success probability under the event Ei(n−k)
equals (
k
i
)
· (1− p)k−i · pn−k+i · 1(
n−i
k−i
) . (B.3)
To simplify equation (B.3), we use the following transformation:
(
k
i
)
· 1(
n−i
k−i
) = k!
i! · (k − i)! ·
1
(n−i)!
(k−i)!·(n−i−[k−i])!
=
k! · (n− k)!
i! · (n− i)!
=
k! · (n− k)!
n!
· n!
i! · (n− i)!
=
1(
n
k
) · (n
i
)
. (B.4)
Using equation (B.4) in equation (B.3), we finally yield
1(
n
k
) · (1− p)k−i · pn−k+i · (n
i
)
. (B.5)
Case i = k: This case differs from the previous ones as the misclassi-
fication of male persons now does not necessarily lead to the failure of the
attacker due to the correct classification of all female persons. We distin-
guish the subcases j = 0, . . . , n− k.
Subcase j = 0: In this subcase, all female persons are correctly classi-
fied and all male persons are misclassified. The probability of this subcase
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equals pk · (1 − p)n−k. Now the attacker has to choose k images out of n
images. From the attacker’s perspective, all of the
(
n
k
)
options are equally
promising but only one option is the correct one. Overall, the probability
with which the attacker succeeds under the event Ek0 equals
pk · (1− p)n−k · 1(n
k
) . (B.6)
Subcase j = 1: In this subcase, all female persons and only one male
person are classified correctly; there are
(
n−k
1
)
options to correctly classify
exactly one male person. Now the attacker has to choose k out of n − 1
options. Similarly to subcase Ek0, from the attacker’s perspective, all of the(
n−1
k
)
options are equally promising but only one option is the correct one.
Overall, the probability with which the attacker succeeds under the event
Ek1 equals
(
n− k
1
)
· pk · (1− p)n−k−1 · p · 1(n−1
k
) = (n− k
1
)
· pk+1 · (1− p)n−k−1 · 1(n−1
k
) .
(B.7)
Subcases j = 2, . . . , (n− k): These cases can be analyzed analo-
gously to the previous two cases, resulting in the success probability (event
Ekj) (
n− k
j
)
· (1− p)n−k−j · pk+j · 1(
n−j
k
) . (B.8)
Analogously to using equation (B.4), we yield
1(
n
k
) · (1− p)n−k−j · pk+j · (n
j
)
. (B.9)
Based on equations (B.5) and (B.9), the overall success probability of an
attacker amounts to
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θ
′
Farett−Gender =
k−1∑
i=0
1(
n
k
) · (1− p)k−i · pn−k+i · (n
i
)
+
n−k∑
j=0
1(
n
k
) · (1− p)n−k−j · pk+j · (n
j
)
=
1(
n
k
) · [k−1∑
i=0
(1− p)k−i · pn−k+i ·
(
n
i
)
+
n−k∑
j=0
(1− p)n−k−j · pk+j ·
(
n
j
) (B.10)
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Probability of correct
gender detection p=80%
from n images
20 30 40 50 60
select k females
5 2.54 0.54 0.14 0.04 0.01
7 1.99 0.33 0.06 0.01 <0.01
9 1.81 0.25 0.04 <0.01 <0.01
11 1.81 0.22 0.03 <0.01 <0.01
Table B.2: Probabilities (in %) with which an AI-based attack on Farett-
Gender succeeds (p=80%)
44
Probability of correct
gender detection p=85%
from n images
20 30 40 50 60
select k females
5 6.64 1.98 0.66 0.25 0.1
7 5.68 1.45 0.4 0.12 0.04
9 5.34 1.29 0.31 0.08 0.02
11 5.34 1.12 0.26 0.06 0.02
Table B.3: Probabilities (in %) with which an AI-based attack on Farett-
Gender succeeds (p=85%)
45
Probability of correct
gender detection p=90%
from n images
20 30 40 50 60
select k females
5 16.88 7.36 3.35 1.59 0.79
7 15.43 6.21 2.59 1.11 0.49
9 14.89 5.67 2.24 0.91 0.37
11 14.89 5.39 2.08 0.8 0.32
Table B.4: Probabilities (in %) with which an AI-based attack on Farett-
Gender succeeds (p=90%)
46
p
n
16 20 24 28 32 36 40
80% 1.26 0.75 0.47 0.31 0.21 0.15 0.11
85% 2.42 1.60 1.09 0.76 0.54 0.39 0.29
90% 4.64 3.48 2.64 2.02 1.56 1.22 0.96
Table B.5: Probabilities (in %) with which an (gender: AI-based, age: brute-
force) attack on Farett-Gender&Age succeeds (k = 3)
47
p=q
n
16 20 24 28 32 36 40
80% 5.35 3.19 1.99 1.3 0.89 0.62 0.46
85% 11.33 7.49 5.08 3.53 2.52 1.83 1.37
90% 23.75 17.79 13.47 10.3 7.96 6.21 4.89
Table B.6: Probabilities (in %) with which an attack (gender: AI-based, age:
AI) on Farett-Gender&Age (k = 3) succeeds
48
Age group (Count) male female
<20 2 1
20-29 60 18
30-39 24 2
40-50 9 0
>50 1 1
Total 96 22
Total count participants 118
Mean age 28.88
Standard deviation σage 7.03
Internet usage (in hours10) Count
<1 23
1-2 15
2-3 17
3-4 11
4-5 14
5-6 10
6-7 15
7-8 1
>8 12
PC-knowledge11 Count
0 1
1-2 1
3-4 0
5-6 9
7-8 48
9-10 58
Table B.7: Characteristics of participants
49
Position
1 2 3 4
Group 1 A B D C
Group 2 B C A D
Group 3 C D B A
Group 4 D A C B
A: reCAPTCHA, B: KCAPTCHA
C: Farett-Gender, D: Farett-Gender&Age
Table B.8: 4x4 Latin Square design, based on [60, p. 542]
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(a) Text-based Captcha - reCAPTCHA (b) Audio-based Captcha
(c) Image-based Captcha - ASIRRA (d) Video-based Captcha - eBay
Figure B.1: Examples of different types of Captchas
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Figure B.2: Screenshot of a challenge of Farett-Gender
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Figure B.3: Screenshot of a challenge of Farett-Gender&Age (task 1)
Figure B.4: Screenshot of a challenge of Farett-Gender&Age (task 2)
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Figure B.5: KCAPTCHA - Example of a challenge
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Figure B.6: Screenshot of reCAPTCHA
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Figure B.7: Screenshot of KCAPTCHA
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Figure B.8: Boxplots of error rates
59
Figure B.9: Boxplots of task completion times
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Figure B.10: Boxplots of learnability
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Figure B.11: Boxplots of satisfaction
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